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Abstract
Peer grading systems make large courses more scal-
able, provide students with faster and more detailed
feedback, and help students to learn by thinking
critically about the work of others. A key obsta-
cle to the broader adoption of peer grading is mo-
tivating students to provide accurate grades. To in-
centivize accurate grading, previous work has con-
sidered mechanisms that spot-check each submis-
sion (i.e., randomly compare it to a TA grade) with
a fixed probability. In this work, we introduce
a mechanism that spot checks students in a way
that depends on the grades they report, providing
the same incentives at lower costs than the fixed-
probability mechanism. We also show, surprisingly,
that TAworkload is reduced by choosing not to spot
check some students evenwhen TA assessments are
available.
1 Introduction
Peer grading has the potential to improve educational out-
comes in three main ways: (i) making classes more scalable
by offloading some grading work to students, (ii) providing
students with faster and more detailed feedback, and (iii)
improving student learning by providing opportunities to
think critically about the work of others. Various recent
implementations of peer grading mechanisms make such
systems relatively easy to deploy in practice (Wright et al.,
2015; De Alfaro and Shavlovsky, 2014; Merrifield and Saari,
2009). The broader adoption of such systems faces a
common, critical obstacle: motivating students to provide ac-
curate grades. A natural solution is asking multiple students
to grade the same assignment and rewarding them based
on their behavior (e.g., based on the extent to which their
grades agree with the grades given by other students). Such
solutions have been explored in detail in a large literature
on peer prediction, which considers how to incentivize
agents to truthfully disclose unverifiable private information
(Faltings et al., 2012; Prelec, 2004; Radanovic and Faltings,
2014; Riley, 2014; Witkowski and Parkes, 2012;
Witkowski et al., 2013; Jurca and Faltings, 2009; Kong et al.,
2016; Jurca and Faltings, 2005; Kamble et al., 2015;
Radanovic and Faltings, 2013; Shnayder et al., 2016).
Miller et al. (2005) were the first to introduce peer prediction
mechanisms in which truthful declarations constitute a Nash
equilibrium. Unfortunately, these mechanisms (and, indeed,
many others that were subsequently proposed) also give rise
to uninformative equilibria in which agents do not reveal their
private information; e.g., all students grading an assignment
favorably regardless of its quality (Jurca and Faltings, 2009;
Witkowski et al., 2013; Kong et al., 2016; Shnayder et al.,
2016; Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013). Human experiments show
that such strategic behavior does arise in practice (Gao et al.,
2014).
Much subsequent work has attempted to identify peer pre-
diction mechanisms in which either no uninformative equi-
librium exists or the truthful equilibrium is always preferred
by agents (Jurca and Faltings, 2009; Witkowski et al., 2013;
Kong et al., 2016; Shnayder et al., 2016). Two examples are
particularly notable. First, Dasgupta and Ghosh (2013) con-
sidered a model in which agents make a binary decision about
whether or not to invest costly effort, in the former case
observing a noisy signal about the assignment’s true value.
Agents are paid according to a function that rewards agree-
ment between graders on the same assignment and penal-
izes correlations in the grades assigned across different as-
signments. Under this mechanism, truthful reporting yields
payoffs that exceed those of any other equilibrium for every
agent. Furthermore, if the system contains a small fraction
of agents (e.g., TAs) who are always truthful, the truthful
equilibrium becomes unique. Second, De Alfaro et al. (2016)
showed how to achieve unique, truthful equilibria by combin-
ing peer predictionwith trusted reports in a hierarchicalmech-
anism. One drawback of all such approaches is that they can-
not do better than Nash equilibrium implementations. This
is because agents’ payoffs depend on other agents’ actions,
and so agents must reason about each other’s behavior. In
a classroom setting, where some students will almost surely
fail to invest effort, students may need stronger incentives; we
thus seek dominant strategy mechanisms. Such mechanisms
can be obtained by incorporating trusted graders (TAs) more
fundamentally into the mechanism: guaranteeing that each
student report is compared to a trusted evaluation (which we
will call a spot check) rather than to other student evaluations
with some sufficiently large probability. The idea of combin-
ing such “spot checking” with peer grading mechanisms to
incentivize accurate grading has been explored in some re-
cent past work (Jurca and Faltings, 2005; Wright et al., 2015;
Gao et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018). Because spot check-
ing is expensive (e.g., TAs need to be paid in proportion to
the amount of work they do), it is natural to seek to mini-
mize the amount of spot checking required to obtain domi-
nant strategies. This minimization problem was first attacked
by Gao et al. (2016), who proposed a very simple mechanism
that makes truthfulness a dominant strategy by uncondition-
ally rewarding students when they are not spot checked and
penalizing them to the extent that they disagree with the TA
otherwise. They compared this mechanism with various al-
ternatives based on peer prediction, showing that the latter
require strictly more spot checking than the former, even de-
spite the fact that peer-prediction-based mechanisms do not
offer dominant strategies.
Gao et al’s model always performs spot checks with some
fixed probability. It is intuitive to think that report-sensitive
spot checking—that is, varying the spot checking probabil-
ity based on the students’ reports—could lower the expected
amount of spot checking required overall. For example, imag-
ine that an instructor already knows that a given problem set is
extremely difficult. If the reported grades for a given submis-
sion are all very high, the instructor might believe that there
is an increased likelihood that students have reported dishon-
estly, and so might want to spot check with a higher probabil-
ity. It turns out to be nontrivial to confirm or refute this intu-
ition, for two key reasons. First, more complex ways of com-
puting spot check probabilities opens the door to new ways
for students to manipulate a mechanism. Second, students’
interests become intertwined in a new way, since spot check-
ing probabilities now depend on other agents’ strategies.
Despite these obstacles, this paper identifies the optimal
dominant-strategy incentive-compatible report-sensitive spot-
checking mechanism, and shows that it requires less spot
checking than the previous state of the art, the simple mecha-
nism of Gao et al. Like much other work in the literature (e.g.,
Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Wang et al., 2018), our analysis
is limited to the case where students are asked to report only
positive or negative grades about each assignment. Our new
mechanism is general in several important senses: it allows
for arbitrary numbers of graders per assignment and nearly
arbitrary1 prior probability distributions over both the true
grades and the noise models describing the probabilities that
students and TAs will observe each signal given the ground
truth.
One final and very recent related paper is worth mention-
ing here. Wang et al. (2018) propose a different approach for
designing peer grading systems that also varies spot check
probabilities. Their model is substantially different from ours,
and hence their mechanism is not directly applicable to our
setting. Like us, they study strategic students who make a bi-
nary decision about whether to invest effort. However, they
also assume that TAs can directly observe whether a student
invested effort, making it simple to ensure that a spot-checked
student who invested no effort gets no reward. In contrast, we
1We restrict these distributions only via the assumption that deter-
ministically spot checking yields dominant strategies for the mecha-
nism of Gao et al; see Assumption 2.8.
assume that the TA noisily observes the assignment’s grade
and is only able to compare this observation to the student’s
own report, which is either a noisy signal or a misreport; thus,
students who invest no effort cannot reliably be identified.
In the remainder of this paper, we first define our model and
formalize the different mechanisms that we study throughout
the paper in Section 2. We prove that our proposed mech-
anism is optimal in Section 3 and show that it outperforms
alternatives in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
A single assignment needs to be graded by a set N of stu-
dents (with |N | = n) and has an unobservable binary quality
q ∈ Q = {a, b} drawn from a commonly known distribution
Pr[q]. Each student i, by exerting effort at cost c, can examine
the submission and observe a signal si ∈ Q that is informa-
tive about the assignment’s quality. More formally, in a way
that depends on the true quality q, the signals observed by
different students are independently drawn from a commonly
known distribution Pr[s|q]. The ex ante signal distribution is
then
Pr [s = l] =
∑
t∈Q
Pr [s = l|q = t] Pr [q = t] .
We denote by P~l the ex ante probability of each agent re-
ceiving the signal corresponding to its index in vector ~l. By
our assumption of conditional independence, this is
P~l :=Pr [s1 = l1, . . . , sn = ln]
=
∑
t∈Q
Pr [q = t]
∏
j∈N
Pr [s = lj |q = t] . (1)
Because of conditional independence, any two vectors of re-
ports ~l and ~l′ containing the same numbers of a’s and b’s
occur with the same probability: P~l = P~l′ . For this rea-
son, we often drop the ordering in the subscript, writing, e.g.,
P(a,b) = P(b,a) = Pab, and similarly for longer vectors. Also,
we name the signals so that Pa ≥ Pb.
Besides the students, a teaching assistant (TA) may also
receive a signal. Formally, signal sTA is drawn from Pr[s|q]
independently from the students’ signals and again depends
on the assignment’s quality q.
Strategy space In our model, each student faces two strate-
gic choices: whether to expend effort grading the assignment
and what grade to report. Three actions are thus possible: the
student (i) may be truthful, investing effort to examine the as-
signment, observing her signal, and reporting this signal; (ii)
may invest effort but report a different signal than the one she
observed; or (iii) may choose not to invest effort and report
an arbitrary signal. In contrast, the TA is not a strategic agent.
When asked to grade the assignment, the TA always reports
an independently observed signal.
2.1 Spot-checking Mechanisms
A focus of our work is on minimizing the need for the TA’s
input via spot-checking mechanisms. A spot-checking mech-
anism takes in students’ reported signals and decides both
whether a TA signal is needed and how much to reward the
students.
Definition 2.1 (Spot-checking mechanism). A spot-checking
mechanism is defined by a tuple (xa, xb, Y ), where:
1. xa : N × N → [0, 1] denotes the probability of spot
checking an agent who reports a. Given two natural
numbers (k, n) specifying the number of a’s reported by
the agents and the total number of agents, xa returns the
probability that the mechanism will spot check agents re-
porting a.
2. xb : N×N→ [0, 1] is an analogous function for comput-
ing the probability of spot checking an agent who reports
b. The first argument remains the total number of agents
who report a, not b.
3. Y : Q×Q→ R+ denotes the reward given to a student
who is spot checked. Y (r, sTA) is the reward given to
a spot-checked student who made report r when the TA
reported signal sTA. When a student is not spot checked,
she receives no reward.
The x functions are defined for every n because we require
peer grading mechanisms to work for any number of agents.
However, when n is obvious from context, we will overload
notation and write simply xa(k) and xb(k).
Throughout this paper we focus on mechanisms where the
reward function Y is the simplest identity function:
Y (r, sTA) =
{
1 if r = sTA
0 otherwise.
This function is called the output agreement reward func-
tion; it has been widely studied in the peer prediction liter-
ature (Witkowski et al., 2013; Waggoner and Chen, 2014).
We model students as having quasilinear utility: i.e., when
investing effort (at cost c) and being rewarded Y , a student’s
utility is Y − c.
Definition 2.2 (DSIC). A spot-checking mechanism is dom-
inant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if, for each stu-
dent i and for any strategies that the other students choose,
i’s expected utility-maximizing strategy over TA signal is to
be truthful, i.e., to invest effort to observe her signal and to
report what she observes.
The mechanism we will later show to be optimal is DSIC;
however, we also define a weaker solution concept (“ICCP”),
to allow us to compare our preferred mechanism to a broader
set. ICCP corresponds to requiring that it be a dominant strat-
egy for students to invest effort under the assumption that ev-
ery student who does observe a signal reports it honestly.
Definition 2.3 (ICCP). A spot-checking mechanism is Incen-
tive Compatible with Conscientious Plays (ICCP) if, for each
student and for any strategy that other students choose, as
long as each student that examines the assignment always re-
ports the observed signal, the truthful strategy, i.e., to invest
effort to examine the assignment and report her observed sig-
nal, is expected utility maximizing over TA signal.
Definition 2.4 (TA workload). For a DSIC or ICCP spot-
checking mechanism, the TA workload (or simply the work-
load) is the probability with which the TA needs to provide a
signal, assuming all students are truthful:
∑
t∈Q
Pr [q = t]
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(Pr [s = a|q = t])j
· (Pr [s = b|q = t])n−j max{xa(j), xb(j)}. (2)
The expressionmax{xa(j), xb(j)} in (2) is the probability
with which the TA needs to be consulted, given that j stu-
dents report a, in order to require that every student reporting
signal a is spot checked with probability xa(j) and every stu-
dent reporting b is spot checked with probability xb(j). We
say that a mechanism is optimal for some class if it minimizes
TA workload among all mechanisms in that class.
2.2 ROS, RSS, and RSUS Mechanisms
We now introduce three families of mechanisms, beginning
with one studied by Gao et al. (2016).
Definition 2.5 (ROS Mechanism). A Report-Oblivious Spot-
checking (ROS) mechanism spot checks every student with
fixed probability x, regardless of the students’ reports.
The focus of this paper is on report-sensitive spot-
checking.
Definition 2.6 (RSS Mechanism). A Report-Sensitive Spot-
checking (RSS) mechanism spot checks every student with
probability that can depend on all the students’ reports.
Once the TA spot checks one student, there is no additional
workload imposed for using the observed signal to spot check
other students too. We now define a class of mechanisms that
leverages this fact.
Definition 2.7 (RSUS Mechanism). A Report-Sensitive, Uni-
form Spot-checking (RSUS) mechanism ensures that when-
ever one student is spot checked, all are spot checked.
In RSUS mechanisms, ∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, xa(j) = xb(j);
of course, it still allows for j 6= j′ that xa(j) 6= xa(j
′).
A main result of this paper is that RSUS mechanisms can
require strictly larger spot-checking budgets than a DSIC RSS
mechanism, and are hence strictly suboptimal, not just under
the DSIC solution concept but even if they only need to sat-
isfy the weaker ICCP solution concept. In other words, para-
doxically, in order to minimize the overall TA workload, it is
necessary to commit sometimes not to use the TA’s signal to
spot check some students.
2.3 Assumptions
We now set up assumptions to ensure that the ROS mech-
anism is DSIC at least with checking probability 1; if not,
the setting is ill conditioned. We make these assumptions
throughout the paper, including our consideration of mech-
anisms other than ROS.
Our first assumption is that a student, upon observing a sig-
nal, expects any other grader (the TA or another student) to
be strictly more likely to observe the same signal than the op-
posite. This assumption is needed to ensure that students are
strictly incentivized to report honestly in ROS mechanisms.
Assumption 2.8. ∀i ∈ N ∪ {TA}, j ∈ N ,
Pr [si = a | sj = a] > Pr [si = b | sj = a] ,
Pr [si = b | sj = b] > Pr [si = a | sj = b] .
Assumption 2.9 is that a student being spot checked with
probability 1 prefers to be truthful than to report an arbitrary
signal without effort.
Assumption 2.9. For any student i and any signal s ∈ Q,
Pr [si = a, sTA = a]
+ Pr [si = b, sTA = b]− c > Pr [si = s] ,
which means Pbb − Pab > c and Paa − Pab > c.
Given Assumption 2.8, Assumption 2.9 can always be
made true by increasing the reward. In effect, Assumption 2.9
can be understood as saying that rewards are large enough to
outweigh the cost of effort.
3 Optimal DSIC Mechanisms
We now characterize optimal DSIC mechanisms in both the
ROS and RSS families.
3.1 ROS Mechanisms
We begin by stating a result about ROS mechanisms from
the literature. Given a prior distribution (Pr[q = q]) over
the assignment’s quality, the conditional signal distributions
Pr[s|q], and the cost of the effort needed to examine the as-
signment, there is a minimum spot-checking probability x
(which is independent of n, the number of students) that guar-
antees an ROS mechanism to be DSIC.
Theorem 3.1. (Consequence of Lemma 1 in Gao et al., 2016)
An ROS mechanism is DSIC if it checks each student with
probability at least
x∗ =
c
Paa + Pbb − Pa
=
c
Pbb − Pab
. (3)
Recall that Pab is the ex ante probability that, when two
signals are drawn (independently, conditioning on the assign-
ment’s quality), the first is a and the second is b. We refer to
x∗ as the optimal DSIC ROS solution, and the ROS mecha-
nism that spot checks with probability x∗ as the optimal ROS
mechanism.
3.2 RSS Mechanisms
We begin by defining a class of mechanisms and then go on to
prove our first main result: that a mechanism from this class
minimizes TA workload across all DSIC RSS mechanisms.
Definition 3.2 (PRSS Mechanism). A Personal-Report-
Sensitive Spot-checking mechanism, or PRSS mechanism,
spot checks each student with a probability that only depends
on the student’s own report.
In PRSS mechanisms, the functions xa and xb are con-
stant. A remarkable feature of PRSS mechanisms is that,
if xa(k) 6= xb(k) for some k, the TA’s input is sometimes
“wasted”, in the sense that it is not used to spot check every
student. To see this, say if xb(k) > xa(k), then the mecha-
nism should consult the TA with probability xb(k) but spot
checks a student reporting a with probability only xa(k).
Our first technical result is a characterization of the opti-
mal DSIC RSS mechanism. We show that this optimum is
always achieved by a PRSS mechanismwith appropriate spot-
checking probabilities.
Theorem 3.3. A PRSS mechanism with the following spot-
checking probabilities is the DSIC RSS mechanism that min-
imizes the TA workload among all other DSIC RSS mecha-
nisms:
xa(k) =
c · Pb
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n} (4)
xb(k) =
c · Pa
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. (5)
This result is nontrivial. Recall that an RSS mechanism has
the power to vary the spot-checking probabilities for each stu-
dent based on the reports of all other students, and such side
information conceivably could help reduce the TA workload
while maintaining the students’ incentives. This turns out not
to be the case. One immediate consequence of Theorem 3.3
is that the TA workload increaseswith the number of students
grading each assignment.
The proof consists of two steps. In Step 1, we reason about
a convex optimization problem that minimizes the workload
but relaxes all of the DISC constraints except those that incen-
tivize the truthful strategy when all other students make no ef-
fort. We show that the intersection point of the non-trivial
constraints in this optimization problem is locally optimal,
and hence, also, the global optimal of the defined optimiza-
tion problem. Then, in Step 2, we show that this solution in
fact gives rise to a DSIC RSS mechanism. Since it is an op-
timal solution with most DSIC constraints relaxed, it is also
optimal when one enforces all constraints.
Proof. Step 1. In a DSIC mechanism, fixing a student i, if all
students other than i report a signal without expending effort,
i should be incentivized to be truthful, i.e., to invest effort
and to report the signal observed. Suppose k other students
report a: then, the utility of student i reporting signal a with-
out investing effort is Pr[sTA = a] · xa(k + 1), whereas her
utility for being truthful is
Pa · Pr [sTA = a | si = a]xa(k + 1)
+ Pb · Pr [sTA = b | si = b]xb(k)− c.
We therefore should have that, for k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
Pa · Pr [sTA = a | si = a]xa(k + 1)
+ Pb · Pr [sTA = b | si = b]xb(k)
− Pr [sTA = a]xa(k + 1) ≥ c. (6)
Similarly we should have for k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} that
Pa · Pr [sTA = a | si = a]xa(k + 1)
+ Pb · Pr [sTA = b | si = b]xb(k)
− Pr [sTA = b]xb(k) ≥ c. (7)
Simplifying (6) and (7), we have
−Pabxa(k + 1) + Pbbxb(k) ≥ c. (8)
Paaxa(k + 1)− Pabxb(k) ≥ c. (9)
Consider minimizing the TA workload subject to (8)
and (9):
min
xa,xb
∑
t∈Q
Pr [q = t]
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(Pr [s = a|q = t])j
· (Pr [s = b|q = t])n−j max{xa(j), xb(j)}.
with 0 ≤ xa(k), xb(k) ≤ 1 for all k ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}. The
value of this optimization problem is an upper bound to the
workload of any DSIC mechanism, since it relaxed all DSIC
constraints except (6) and (7). Note also that the objective
function is convex in the variables, due to the presence of
the max functions, and its feasible region is a convex poly-
tope since all constraints are linear. There are 2n variables:
xb(0), xa(1), xb(1), xa(2), . . . , xa(n− 1), xb(n− 1), xa(n).
(Note that xa(0) and xb(n) are undefined.) These variables
can be grouped into n pairs, with xb(k) and xa(k + 1) as a
pair for each k. Each pair is subject to a pair of constraints
from (8) and (9) with the corresponding k, and there is no con-
straint governing variables from different pairs. This means
the optimization problem is separated into n subproblems,
one for each pair of variables. We now claim that the optimal
solution for each subproblem is given by forcing (8) and (9) to
be tight, which gives us the expressions in (4) and (5). We first
check that these solutions are feasible: by Assumptions 2.8
and 2.9, Pbb − Pab ≥ c and Paa ≥ Pab, which implies that
the spot-checking probabilities in (4) and (5) are indeed be-
tween 0 and 1. To see that these solutions are optimal, we
invoke the convexity of the problem, which means we only
need to argue that the solutions are locally optimal. At the
point where (8) and (9) are tight for a given k, increasing
xa(k + 1) forces xb(k) to increase, and vice versa, in order
for the pair to keep being feasible — this is a consequence
of the coefficients’ signs in (8) and (9) — but it is not feasi-
ble to decrease both variables. Therefore the only local move
within the feasible region is to increase both variables. How-
ever, both variables have positive coefficients in the objective
function. Therefore the solution in (4) and (5) is both locally
optimal and globally optimal for our convex program.
Step 2. We now show that the spot-checking probabilities
given in (4) and (5) in fact give rise to a DSIC mechanism.
We only need to check the validity of the DSIC constraints
not included in the convex program above.
We first check the condition that a student having spent
the effort to get a signal should be incentivized to report the
observation faithfully. We need for k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
Pr [sTA = a | si = a]xa(k + 1)
≥ Pr [sTA = b | si = a]xb(k), (10)
and
Pr [sTA = b | si = b]xb(k)
≥ Pr [sTA = a | si = b]xa(k + 1), (11)
which simplify to
Paaxa(k + 1)− Pabxb(k) ≥ 0. (12)
−Pabxa(k + 1) + Pbbxb(k) ≥ 0. (13)
Note that (12) and (13) are in fact implied by (8) and (9).
For the other DSIC constraints that concern a student’s util-
ity when some other students may spend effort to observe a
signal, note that the spot-checking probabilities given by (4)
and (5) are independent of k, i.e., they are independent from
what the other students report, and therefore the correspond-
ing mechanism is PRSS. In such a mechanism, a student’s
utility is independent from the other students’ strategies. If
the truthful strategy maximizes a student’s utility when no
other student spends any effort, it still does when other stu-
dents spend effort. Therefore the mechanism obtained from
Step 1 is indeed DSIC, and this completes the proof.
4 Comparing ROS, RSS, and RSUS
Drawing on our characterization from Section 3, we can
now compare the workloads required by each of the different
mechanisms discussed in Section 2.1. We begin by compar-
ing the TA workload of the optimal DSIC RSS mechanism
with that of the optimal DSIC ROS Mechanism.
Corollary 4.1. When Pa > Pb, the TA workload of the opti-
mal DSIC ROS mechanism exceeds that of the optimal DSIC
RSS mechanism by at least
cPb
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, the optimal DSIC ROS solution is
c
Pbb − Pab
.
Therefore, from (4) and (5), the TA workload saved by the
RSS mechanism is:
c
(
P~a
(
x∗ −
cPb
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
)
+(1− P~a)
(
x∗ −
cPa
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
))
≥ c
(
x∗ −
cPa
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
)
= c
(
1
Pbb − Pab
−
Pa
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
)
≥
cPb
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
,
where the first and second inequalities are due to the facts that
Pa ≥ Pb and Paa ≥ Pab.
Corollary 4.2. When Pa = Pb, the TA workload of the op-
timal DSIC RSS mechanism is equal to that of the optimal
DSIC ROS mechanism.
Proof. The optimal DSIC ROS solution is c
Pbb−Pab
. Also,
when Pa = Pb, Pa − Pab = Paa = Pb − Pab = Pbb, and
xa(k) = xb(k), for any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Thus, the TA work-
load that the RSS mechanism saves is:
c
(
1
Pbb − Pab
−
Pb
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
)
=
PaaPbb − (Pab)
2 − (Pbb + Pab)(Pbb − Pab)
(Pbb − Pab)(PaaPbb − (Pab)2)
= 0.
We now turn to comparing RSUS and RSS mechanisms.
Because RSUS mechanisms are special cases of RSS mech-
anisms, it is obvious that the former perform weakly worse
than the latter, all else being equal. Our second nontrivial
main result shows something stronger: that the optimal RSS
mechanism is strictly better than all RSUS mechanisms, even
when the latter are strengthened by being required to satisfy
only the ICCP solution concept. The proof is based on a linear
program that lower bounds the workload of the optimal RSUS
mechanism under the ICCP constraints. We show that this
workload is still greater than that of the optimal RSS mecha-
nism. Recall that RSUS mechanisms spot check all students
whenever the TA is consulted. Our result thus implies that the
TA workload can be decreased by choosing not to spot check
certain students even when the TA spot checks other students.
Theorem 4.3. When Pa > Pb, the optimal RSS under the
DISC solution concept spot checks strictly less than the opti-
mal RSUS mechanism under the ICCP solution concept.
Remark. It is straightforward to see that in the case of Pa =
Pb, the TA workload of the optimal ICCP RSUS mechanism
is equal to the optimal DSIC RSS and ROS mechanisms.
Proof. The RSUS mechanisms are special cases of the RSS
mechanisms, where xa(k) = xb(k) = x(k) for k ∈
{0, . . . , n}. We prove this theorem by showing that the op-
timal solution of an adapted version of the RSS convex opti-
mization problem for the RSUS mechanisms is strictly worse
than the optimal DSIC RSS solution defined by (4) and (5).
Once xa(k) = xb(k), for any student i, we get the following.
min
x
∑
t∈Q
Pr [q = t]
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(Pr [s = a|q = t])j
· (Pr [s = b|q = t])n−jx(k) (14)
subject to:
−Pabx(k + 1) + Pbbx(k) ≥ c ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (15)
Paax(k + 1)− Pabx(k) ≥ c ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (16)
−Pabx(k + 1) + Pbbx(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (17)
Paax(k + 1)− Pabx(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} (18)
0 ≤ x(k) ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n} (19)
The derivation of Constraints (15)–(18) is similar to that of
Constraints(8)–(13) in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Observe
that our optimization problem is now a linear program and
that Constraints (17) and (18) are implied by Constraints (15)
and (16); thus, they can be removed from the linear program
without changing the optimal solution.
We start from the optimal DSIC ROS solution x∗ and de-
crease x(n) by
△x(n) = c
Pa − Pb
Pbb − Pab
·
Pbb
PaaPbb − (Pab)2
and the rest of the spot checking probabilities by
△x(k) =
(
Pbb
Pab
)
△ x(k − 1), ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. (20)
At x∗, Constraint (15) becomes tight, following directly from
our construction of the step size given by (20). Constraint
(16) is tight when k = n − 1; the rest of the constraints
are easily satisfied. Hence, we only need to show that Con-
straint (16) will not be violated by the specified decrease in
the decision variables. However, by (20) we get that for
k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, the ratios by which the gap between
the left and right hand sides of Constraints (16) decreases is(
Pab
Pbb
)(n−k)
≤ 1 times the ratio by which the gap for the con-
straint corresponding to n = k − 1 is decreasing. Therefore,
the constraint corresponding to n = k − 1 binds faster.
As a result, since Constraint (15) and (16) when k = n− 1
are all binding, we can not decrease any of the decision vari-
ables anymore without increasing another. Since every ob-
jective coefficient is positive, increasing x(k) for any k ∈
{0, . . . , n} could be beneficial only if it resulted in decreas-
ing the value of the rest of the decision variables, achiev-
ing an overall objective function improvement. However, if
x(k + 1) is increased then x(k) needs to increase as well to
preserve feasibility; if x(k) increases then x(k − 1) needs to
increase as well; and so on. Thus, overall, there exist no local,
objective-improving changes to the current values of x(k),
and so we have identified an optimal solution to our linear
program. Finding the intersection point of the binding con-
straints shows that xn = x
a ≤ xn−1 = x
b < xn−2, . . . , <
x0, which leads to the result of the theorem statement.
2
5 Conclusion
We have investigated peer grading mechanisms that achieve
dominant-strategy incentive compatibility by using TAs to
spot check students, and have focused on minimizing the
required TA workload. We have explored mechanisms for
report-sensitive spot checking: varying spot-checking prob-
abilities based on the profile of grades that all students re-
port for a given assignment. We proposed a simple opti-
mal DSIC “PRSS” mechanism, and showed that it minimizes
the required spot-checking budget (across both the “RSS”
mechanisms and the more constrained “RSUS” mechanisms
even under a weaker solution concept) and outperforms the
(“ROS”) mechanisms that spot checks all students with a
fixed, report-oblivious probability.
We consider the most important direction for future work
to be generalizing our results beyond two signals. We note
2Note that we actually prove more than claimed in the theorem
statement: our result holds not only for the ICCP solution concept,
but also for any strategies in which none of the students invest the
grading effort.
that this would require a fundamentally different proof tech-
nique, as our convex programming formulation depends crit-
ically on the problem’s two-signal structure. We expect that
the multi-signal setting would also require other variations in
the model. Notably, in such domains it becomes natural to im-
pose an ordering over the signals and to reward agents accord-
ing to the distance between their reports and that of the TA,
rather than rewarding all “correct” reports equally. Another
limitation of our work is the assumption that the prior distri-
bution over signals is known to the mechanism designer. The
derivation of prior-independent report-sensitive mechanisms
is a second, worthwhile direction for future work. One possi-
ble strategy for building such mechanisms could be learning
the prior in a repeated setting.
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